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Abstract
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite
game classes. However, solving continuous games—in which the pure strategy space is (potentially un-
countably) infinite—is far more challenging. Nonetheless, many real-world domains have continuous
action spaces, e.g., where actions refer to an amount of time, money, or other resource that is naturally
modeled as being real-valued as opposed to integral. We present a new algorithm for computing Nash
equilibrium strategies in continuous games. In addition to two-player zero-sum games, our algorithm
also applies to multiplayer games and games of imperfect information. We experiment with our algo-
rithm on a continuous imperfect-information Blotto game, in which two players distribute resources over
multiple battlefields. Blotto games have frequently been used to model national security scenarios and
have also been applied to electoral competition and auction theory. Experiments show that our algorithm
is able to quickly compute very close approximations of Nash equilibrium strategies for this game.
1 Introduction
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing approximate Nash equilibrium strategies in a
variety of finite game classes, even classes that are challenging from a computational complexity perspec-
tive. For example, an algorithm that was recently applied for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies in
six-player no-limit Texas hold ’em poker defeated strong human professional players [8]. This is an ex-
tremely large extensive-form game of imperfect information. Even solving three-player perfect-information
strategic-form games is challenging from a theoretical complexity perspective; it is PPAD-hard to compute
a Nash equilibrium in two-player general-sum and multiplayer games and widely believed that no efficient
algorithms exist [10, 11, 12]. Strong algorithms have also been developed for stochastic games, even with
multiple players and imperfect information [18]. Stochastic games have potentially infinite duration, but a
finite number of states and actions per state.
Continuous games are fundamentally different from finite games in several important ways. The first
is that they are not guaranteed to have a Nash equilibrium; John Nash’s theorem only proved existence of
Nash equilibrium in finite games [27]. A second challenge is that we may not even be able to represent
mixed strategies in continuous games, as they correspond to probability distributions over a potentially
(uncountably) infinite pure strategy space. So even if a game has a Nash equilibrium, we may not even be
able to represent it, let alone compute it. Equilibrium existence results and algorithms have been developed
for certain specialized classes; however, there are still many important game classes for which these results
do not hold. Even two-player zero-sum games remain a challenge. For example, the fictitious play algorithm
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has been proven to converge to Nash equilibrium for finite two-player zero-sum games (and certain classes
of multiplayer and non zero-sum games), but this result does not extend to continuous games [32].
A strategic-form game consists of a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a finite set of pure strategies
Si for each player i, and a real-valued utility for each player for each strategy vector (aka strategy profile),
ui : ×iSi → R. A two-player game is called zero sum if the sum of the payoffs for all strategy profiles
equals zero, i.e., u1(s1, s2) + u2(s1, s2) = 0 for all s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2.
A mixed strategy σi for player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies, where σi(si′) is the
probability that player i plays si′ ∈ Si under σi. Let Σi denote the full set of mixed strategies for player
i. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, . . . , σ∗n) is a Nash equilibrium if ui(σ∗i , σ
∗
−i) ≥ ui(σi, σ∗−i) for all σi ∈ Σi
for all i ∈ N , where σ∗−i denotes the vector of the components of strategy σ∗ for all players excluding i. It
is well known that a Nash equilibrium exists in all finite games [27]. In practice all that we can hope for is
convergence of iterative algorithms to an approximation of Nash equilibrium. For a given candidate strategy
profile σ∗, define (σ∗) = maxi maxσi∈Σi
[
ui(σi, σ
∗
−i)− ui(σ∗i , σ∗−i)
]
. The goal is to compute a strategy
profile σ∗ with as small a value of  as possible (i.e.,  = 0 would indicate that σ∗ comprises an exact Nash
equilibrium). We say that a strategy profile σ∗ with value  constitutes an -equilibrium. For two-player
zero-sum games, there are algorithms with bounds on the value of  as a function of the number of iterations
and game size, and for different variations  is proven to approach zero in the limit at different worst-case
rates (e.g., [20]).
If σ1i and σ
2
i are two mixed strategies for player i, and p ∈ (0, 1), then we can consider mixed strategy
σ′i = pσ
1
i + (1− p)σ2i in two different ways. The first interpretation, which is the traditional one, is that σ′i
is the mixed strategy that plays pure strategy si ∈ Si with probability pσ1i (si) + (1 − p)σ2(si). Thus, σ′i
can itself be represented as a single mixed strategy vector of length |Si|. A second interpretation is that σ′i
is the mixed strategy that with probability p selects an action by randomizing according to the probability
distribution σ1, and with probability 1 − p selects an action by randomizing according to σ2. Using this
interpretation implementing σ′i would require storing the full strategy vectors for both σ
1 and σ2, though
clearly the result would be the same as in the first case.
In extensive-form imperfect-information games, play proceeds down nodes in a game tree. At each
node x, the player function P (x) denote the player to act at x. This player can be from the finite set N ,
or an additional new player called Chance or Nature. Each player’s nodes are partitioned into information
sets, where the player cannot distinguish between the nodes at a given information set. Each player has
a finite set of available actions at each of the player’s nodes (note that the action sets must be identical
at all nodes in the same information set, because the player cannot distinguish the nodes). When play
arrives at a leaf node in the game tree, a terminal real-valued payoff is obtained for each player according
to utility function ui. Nash equilibrium existence and computational complexity results from strategic-form
games hold similarly for imperfect-information extensive-form games; e.g., all finite games are guaranteed
to have a Nash equilibrium, two-player zero-sum games can be solved in polynomial time, and equilibrium
computation for other game classes is PPAD-hard.
Randomized strategies can have two different interpretations in extensive-form games. Note that a pure
strategy for a player corresponds to a selection of an action for each of that player’s information sets. The
classic definition of a mixed strategy in an extensive-form game is the same as for strategic-form games: a
probability distribution over pure strategies. However, in general the number of pure strategies is exponential
in the size of the game tree, so a mixed strategy would correspond to a probability vector of exponential size.
By contrast, the concept of a behavioral strategy in an extensive-form game corresponds to a strategy that
assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible actions at each of the player’s information sets.
Since the number of information sets is linear in the size of the game tree, representing a behavioral strategy
requires only storing a probability vector of size that is linear in the size of the game tree. Therefore, it is
much preferable to work with behavioral strategies than mixed strategies, and algorithms for extensive-form
games generally operate on behavioral strategies. Kuhn’s theorem states that in any finite extensive-form
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game with perfect recall, for any player and any mixed strategy, there exists a behavior strategy that induces
the same distribution over terminal nodes as the mixed strategy against all opponent strategy profiles [26].
The converse is also true. Thus, mixed strategies are still functionally equivalent to behavioral strategies,
despite the increased complexity of representing them.
Continuous games generalize finite strategic-form games to the case of (uncountably) infinite strategy
spaces. Many natural games have an uncountable number of actions; for example, games in which strategies
correspond to an amount of time, money, or space. One example of a game that has recently been modeled
as a continuous game in the AI literature is computational billiards, in which the strategies are vectors of
real numbers corresponding to the orientation, location, and velocity at which to hit the ball [3].
Definition 1. A continuous game is a tuple G = (N,S, U) where
• N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} is the set of players,
• S = (S1, . . . , Sn) where each Si is a (compact) metric space corresponding to the set of strategies of
player i, and
• U = (u1, . . . , un) where ui : S → R is the utility function of player i.
Mixed strategies are the space of Borel probability measures on Si. The existence of a Nash equilibrium
for any continuous game with continuous utility functions can been proven using Glicksberg’s generalization
of the Kakutani fixed point theorem [21]. The result is stated formally in Theorem 1 [14]. In general, there
may not be a solution if we allow non-compact strategy spaces or discontinuous utility functions. We can
define extensive-form imperfect-information continuous games similarly as for finite games, with analogous
definitions of mixed and behavioral strategies.
Theorem 1. Consider a strategic-form game whose strategy spaces Si are nonempty compact subsets of a
metric space. If the payoff functions ui are continuous, there exists a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium.
While this existence result has been around for a long time, there has been very little work on practical
algorithms for computing equilibria in continuous games. One interesting class of continuous games for
which algorithms have been developed is separable games [34]:
Definition 2. A separable game is a continuous game with utility functions ui : S → R taking the form
ui(s) =
m1∑
j1=1
. . .
mn∑
jn=1
aj1...jni f
j1
1 (s1) . . . f
jn
n (sn),
where aj1...jni ∈ R and the f ji : Si → R are continuous.
This is a significant restriction on the utility functions, and many interesting continuous games are not
separable. Additionally, algorithms for computing approximate equilibria have been developed for several
other classes of continuous games, including simulation-based games [35], graphical tree-games [33], and
continuous poker models [19]. The continuous Blotto game that we will consider does not fit in any of these
classes, and in fact has discontinuous utility functions, so we cannot apply Theorem 1 or these algorithms.
A classic example of a continuous game with no Nash equilibrium is the “guess the larger number”
game, where two players each simultaneously write down a number (typically an integer), and the player
who wrote the larger number wins W while the other player loses W (players get 0 for a tie). It is clear that
even if we let players use mixed strategies (that correspond to probability distributions over infinitely many
integers), the players would have incentive to deviate to distributions that put more weight on larger integers
than the opponent’s.
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2 Continuous Blotto game
The Blotto game is a type of two-player zero-sum game in which the players are tasked to simultaneously
distribute limited resources over several objects (or battlefields). In the classic version of the game, the
player devoting the most resources to a battlefield wins that battlefield, and the gain (or payoff) is then equal
to the total number of battlefields won. The Blotto game was first proposed and solved by Borel in 1921 [5],
and has been frequently applied to national security scenarios. It has also been applied as a metaphor for
electoral competition, with two political parties devoting money or resources to attract the support of a fixed
number of voters: each voter is a “battlefield” that can be won by one or the other party. The same game
also finds application in auction theory where bidders must make simultaneous bids [36].
Initial approaches derived analytical solutions for special cases of the general problem. Borel and Ville
proposed the first solution for three battlefields [6], and Gross and Wagner generalized this result for any
number of battlefields [22]. However, they assumed colonels have the same number of troops. Roberson
computes the optimal strategies of the Blotto games in the continuous version of the problem where all
the battlefields have the same weight, for models with both symmetric and asymmetric budgets [31]. Hart
considered the discrete version, again when all battlefields have equal weight, and solved it for certain
special cases [24]. It was not until 2016 that the first algorithm was provided for solving the general version
of the game. Initially a polynomial-time algorithm that involved solving exponential-sized linear programs
was presented [2], which was later improved to a linear program of polynomial size [4]. These polynomial-
time algorithms are for the discrete version of the game; however, no general algorithm has been devised
for the original continuous Blotto game. As described earlier, there are many challenges present for solving
continuous games that do not exist for finite games, even for two-player zero-sum games.
Most of the prior approaches solve perfect-information versions of the game in which all players have
public knowledge of the values of the battlefields. Adamo and Matros study a Blotto game in which players
have incomplete information about the other player’s resource budgets [1]. Kovenock and Roberson study a
model where the players are subject to incomplete information about the battlefield valuations [25]. In both
of these works, all players are equally uninformed about the parameters. Recently some work has provided
analytical solutions for certain settings with asymmetric information, in which both players know the values
of the battlefields, but one player knows their order, while the other player only knows a distribution over the
possible orders [28, 9]. This model is an imperfect-information game in which player 1 must select a strat-
egy without knowing the order, while player 2 can select a different mixed strategy conditional on the actual
order. We will be studying and presenting an algorithm for the asymmetric imperfect-information continu-
ous version of the Blotto game, which is perhaps the most challenging variant. Note that our approach will
also apply to the perfect information version as well.
A continuous Blotto game is a tuple G = (N,F,O, p, v, B, S, δ, u):
• Set of players N = {1, 2}
• Set F of battlefields
• Set O of outcomes, which is a subset of the set of permutations of elements of F .
• Probability mass function p with p(o) for each o ∈ O
• Positive real value vf for each battlefield f ∈ F
• Positive real-valued budget Bi for each player i ∈ N
• Pure strategy space of player 1 S1 is {(xi) ∈ R|F ||
∑
i xi = B1, xi ≥ 0∀i ∈ N}.
• Pure strategy space of player 2 S2 is {(xo,i) ∈ R|F ||O||
∑
i xo,i = B2∀o ∈ O, xo,i ≥ 0∀o, i}.
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• δ ∈ R > 0
• Utility function u1(s1, s2) =
∑
o p(o)
∑
f C(s1(f), s2(o, f)) for s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2, where
– C(s1(f), s2(o, f) = vf if s1(f) ≥ s2(o, f) + δ,
– C(s1(f), s2(o, f) = −vf if s1(f) ≤ s2(o, f),
– C(s1(f), s2(o, f) = 0 otherwise
• Utility function u2(s1, s2) =
∑
o p(o)
∑
f C(s1(f), s2(o, f)) for s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2, where
– C(s1(f), s2(o, f) = −vf if s1(f) ≥ s2(o, f) + δ,
– C(s1(f), s2(o, f) = vf if s1(f) ≤ s2(o, f),
– C(s1(f), s2(o, f) = 0 otherwise
Each player must select a real-valued amount of resources to put on battlefield f ∈ F , subject to the
constraint that the total does not exceed the player’s budgetBi. Player 1 does not know the outcome o, which
defines the order of the battlefields; he only knows that the outcome is o ∈ O with probability p(o). Player
2 knows the order, and is able to condition his strategy on this additional information. For each battlefield
f , if player 1 uses an amount of resources s1(f) that exceeds player 2’s amount s2(o, f) by at least δ, then
player 1 “wins” the battlefield and receives its value vf (and player 2 receives −vf ); if s2(o, f) ≥ s1(f)
then player 2 wins vf and player 1 loses vf ; otherwise both players get zero. This game is clearly zero sum
because player 1 and player 2’s payoff sum to zero for each situation.
Note that the utility function is discontinuous: payoffs for a given battlefield can shift abruptly between
vf , 0, and −vf with arbitrarily small changes in the strategies. This means that Theorem 1 does not apply,
and the game is not necessarily guaranteed to have a Nash equilibrium. The game does also not fall into
the specialized classes of games such as separable games for which prior algorithms have been developed.
Note that often the Blotto game is presented without the δ term; typically player 1 wins the battlefield if
s1(f) > s2(o, f), and player 2 wins if s2(o, f) ≥ s1(f). We add in the δ term because our algorithm will
involve the invocation of a commercial optimization solver, and optimization algorithms typically cannot
handle strict inequalities. We can set δ to a value very close to zero.
3 Algorithm
Fictitious play is an iterative algorithm that has been demonstrated to converge to Nash equilibrium in two-
player zero-sum games (and in certain other game classes), though not in general for multiplayer or non-
zero-sum games [7, 32]. While it is not guaranteed to converge in multiplayer games, it has been proven
that if it does converge, then the average of the strategies played throughout the iterations constitute an
equilibrium [13]. Fictitious play has been successfully applied to approximate Nash equilibrium strategies
in a 3-player poker tournament to a small degree of approximation error [17, 18]. More recently fictitious
play has also been used to approximate equilibrium strategies in multiplayer auction [29, 30] and national
security [16] scenarios. Fictitious play has been demonstrated to outperform another popular iterative al-
gorithm, counterfactual regret minimization, in convergence to equilibrium in a range of multiplayer game
classes [15].
In classical fictitious play, each player plays a best response to the average strategies of his opponents
thus far. Strategies are initialized arbitrarily (typically they are initialized to be uniformly random). Then
each player uses the following rule to obtain the average strategy at time t:
σti =
(
1− 1
t
)
σt−1i +
1
t
σ′ti ,
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where σ′ti is a best response of player i to the profile σ
t−1
−i of the other players played at time t− 1. The final
strategy output after T iterations σT is the average of the strategies played in the individual iterations (while
the best response σ′ti is the strategy actually played at iteration t).
The classical version of fictitious play involves representing two strategies per player; the current strat-
egy σti and the current best response σ
′t
i . Note that once we compute the next round strategy σ
t+1
i from σ
t
i
and σ′t+1i , we no longer need to maintain either σ
t
i or σ
′t1
i in memory. We interpret σ
t
i as a single mixed
strategy that selects action sj with probability
(
1− 1t
)
σt−1i (sj) +
1
tσ
′t
i (sj).
An alternative, and seemingly nonsensical, way to implement fictitious play would be to separately
store each of the pure strategies that are played σ′ti , rather than to explicitly average them at each step. Using
this representation, the best response can be computed by selecting the pure strategy that maximizes the
average (or sum) of the utilities against σ′0−i, . . . , σ
′t−1
−i . This method of implementing fictitious play seems
nonsensical for several reasons. First, it involves picking a strategy that maximizes the sum of utilities
against t different opponent strategies as opposed to maximizing the utility against a single strategy. And
second, it involves storing t pure strategies for each player, which would require using significantly more
memory than the original approach when t exceeds |Si|. Despite these clear drawbacks, nonetheless it is
apparent that this approach is still equivalent to the original approach and will result in the same sequence
of strategies being played. When the algorithm is applied to an imperfect-information game we can view
it as operating with mixed as opposed to behavioral strategies (in contrast to prior algorithms for solving
imperfect-information games). We will refer to this new approach as “Redundant fictitious play” due to
the fact that it “redundantly” stores all the strategies played individually instead of storing them as a single
mixed strategy. Redundant fictitious play is depicted in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Redundant fictitious play for two-player games
Inputs: Number of iterations T
Initialize strategy arrays S1[T ], S2[T ]
S1[0], S2[0]← InitialValues()
v∗1[0]← u1(S1[0], S2[0])
v∗2[0]← u2(S1[0], S2[0])
for t = 1 to T do
S1[t]← BestResponse1(Mix(S2, 0, t− 1))
S2[t]← BestResponse2(Mix(S1, 0, t− 1))
1[t]← u1(S1[t],Mix(S2, 0, t− 1))− v∗1[t− 1]
2[t]← u2(Mix(S1, 0, t− 1), S2[t])− v∗2[t− 1]
[t]← maxi i[t]
v∗1[t]← u1(Mix(S1, 0, t),Mix(S2, 0, t))
v∗2[t]← u2(Mix(S1, 0, t),Mix(S2, 0, t))
In Algorithm 1, we store T strategies for each player, where T is the total number of iterations. We
can initialize strategies arbitrarily for the first iteration (e.g., to uniform random). For all subsequent iter-
ations the strategies Si[t] will be a pure strategy best response to a strategy of the opponent. The notation
Mix(Si, 0, t − 1) refers to the mixed strategy for player i that plays strategy Si[u] with probability 1t , for
0 ≤ u ≤ t− 1; that is, it mixes uniformly over the strategies Si[0], . . . , Si[t− 1]. The algorithm then com-
putes the game value to player i under the current iteration strategies, as well as the exploitability of each
player (difference between best response payoff and game value). This determines the maximum amount
that each player can gain by deviating from the strategies; we can then say that the strategies computed at
iteration t− 1 constitute an t-equilibrium, where t = maxi i[t].
Now, suppose that G is a continuous game and no longer a finite game. Assuming that we initialize
the strategies Si[0] to be pure strategies, all of the strategies Si[t] are now pure strategies, and the algorithm
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does not need to represent any mixed strategies. This is very useful, since for continuous games a mixed
strategy may be a probability distribution that puts weight on infinitely many pure strategies, which cannot
be represented. However, pure strategies can typically be represented compactly in continuous games. For
example, if the strategy spaces are compact subsets of Rn, then each pure strategy corresponds to a vector
of n real numbers, which can be easily represented assuming that n is a small constant. For example
in continuous Blotto player 1 must select an amount of resource to use for each of |F | battlefields, and
therefore storing a pure strategy requires storing |F | real numbers, which is easy to do. Thus, Redundant
Fictitious Play can be feasibly applied to continuous games, while the classical version cannot.
The only remaining challenge for continuous games is the best response computation, which may be
challenging for certain complex utility functions. However, for the common assumptions that the pure
strategy spaces are compact and the utility functions are continuous, this optimization will typically be
feasible to compute.
For the continuous Blotto game, we present optimization formulations for computing player 1 and 2’s
best response below. Both of these are mixed integer linear programs (with a polynomial number of variables
and constraints). Note that we are able to construct efficient best response procedures for this game despite
the fact that the utility function is discontinuous.
Player 1’s best response function:
Maximize
∑
t
∑
o
∑
f (p(o) · bt,o,f · vo,f ) such that:
bt,o,f = 1→ Xf ≥ Yt,o,f + δ for all t, o, f (1)∑
f
Xf = B1 (2)
0 ≤ Xf ≤ B1 for all f (3)
bt,o,f binary in {0, 1} for all t, o, f (4)
The constraints in Equation 1 are called indicator constraints and state that if the binary variable bt,o,f
has value equal to 1, then the linear constraintXf ≥ Yt,o,f +δ must hold. Indicator constraints are supported
by many integer-linear program optimization solvers, such as CPLEX and Gurobi. We could additionally
impose the additional indicator constraints bt,o,f = 0 → Xf ≤ Yt,o,f , however these are unnecessary and
would significantly increase the size of the problem. To see the correctness of the procedure, suppose that
Xf ≥ Yt,o,f + δ and
∑
f Xf = Bx but that bt,o,f = 0. Then the objective would clearly be increased by
setting bt,o,f = 1 instead, to include the additional term p(o) · bt,o,f · vo,f . So there cannot exist another
solution satisfying the budget and indicator constraints with higher objective value.
While player 1 must assume that the outcome is distributed according to p, player 2 is aware of the
outcome, and therefore can condition his strategy on it. Therefore, player 2 will solve a separate optimization
for each value of o ∈ O to compute his best response to a strategy of player 1.
Player 2’s best response function given outcome o ∈ O:
Maximize
∑
t
∑
s (bt,f · vo,f ) such that:
bt,f = 1→ Yf ≥ Xt,f for all t, f (5)∑
f
Yf = B2 (6)
0 ≤ Yf ≤ B2 for all f (7)
bt,f binary in {0, 1} for all t, f (8)
Correctness of player 2’s best response function follows by similar reasoning to that of player 1’s. Player
1’s best response optimization has T ′|O||F | binary variables bt,o,f , where T ′ is the current algorithm itera-
tion, and |F | continuous variables Xf . Since the number of indicator constraints is also T ′|O||F |, the size
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of the formulation is O(T |O||F |), which is polynomial in all of the input parameters. Similarly, player 2
must solve |O| optimizations, each one with size O(T ′|F |). Note that in practice this algorithm could be
parallelized by solving each of these |O|+ 1 optimizations simultaneously on separate cores as opposed to
solving them sequentially (in our implementation we solve them sequentially). However, since player 1’s
optimization is much larger than each of player 2’s, the bottleneck step is player 1’s optimization, and such
parallelization may not provide a significant reduction in the runtime.
Note that as we run successive iterations of Algorithm 1, the size of these optimization problems be-
comes larger, since the opponent’s strategy is a mixture over t pure strategies, where t is the current algo-
rithm iteration. We have seen that the number of variables and constraints scales linearly in t. Therefore,
we would expect earlier iterations of the algorithm to run significantly faster than later iterations. We will
see the exact magnitude of this disparity in the experiments in Section 4. A potential solution to this issue
would be to include an additional parameter K in Algorithm 1. Instead of computing a best response to
the mixture over all t of the opponent’s pure strategies, a subset of K of them is selected by sampling, and
a best response is computed just to a uniform mixture over the pure strategies in the sampled subset. This
sampling would occur for each iteration, so a potentially different subset of sizeK would be selected at each
iteration. This would ensure that the complexity of the best response computations remains constant over
all iterations and does not become intractable for later iterations. This approach would be unbiased, and
produce the same result in expectation over the sampling outcomes. However, it may lead to high variance
in results and lead to poor convergence in practice. Perhaps this could be mitigated by performing multiple
runs of the sampling algorithm in parallel and selecting the run with lowest value of .
Note that Algorithm 1 can be applied to extensive-form imperfect-information games in addition to
simultaneous strategic-form games (in fact the continuous Blotto game that we apply it to has imperfect
information for player 1, since he does not know the value of o while player 2 does). As long as pure
strategies can be represented and best responses can be computed efficiently (which are both the case for
imperfect-information games), the algorithm can be applied. Also note that while we have presented the
algorithm just for a two player game, it can also be run on multiplayer games (just as for standard fictitious
play). The best response computations are still just a single agent optimization problem given fixed strategies
for the opposing players. In fact, fictitious play has been demonstrated to obtain successful convergence to
Nash equilibrium in a variety of multiplayer settings [15], despite the fact that it is not guaranteed to converge
to Nash equilibrium in general for games that are not two-player zero-sum.
We can compute v∗1[t] and 1[t] for Algorithm 1 in the continuous Blotto game using the procedures
depicted in Algorithms 2 and 3 (and analogously for v∗2[t] and 2[t]).
Algorithm 2 Procedure to compute v∗1[t] in continuous Blotto
v∗1[t]← 0
for t1 = 0 to t do
for t2 = 0 to t do
for o ∈ O do
for f ∈ F do
if S1[t1](f) ≥ S2[t2](o, f) + δ then
v∗1[t]← v∗1[t] + p(o)vf
else if S1[t1](f) ≤ S2[t2](o, f) then
v∗1[t]← v∗1[t]− p(o)vf
v1[t]← v1[t](t+1)2
return v1[t]
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Algorithm 3 Procedure to compute 1[t] in continuous Blotto
1[t]← 0
for t2 = 0 to t− 1 do
for o ∈ O do
for f ∈ F do
if S1[t](f) ≥ S2[t2](o, f) + δ then
1[t]← 1[t] + p(o)vf
else if S1[t](f) ≤ S2[t2](o, f) then
1[t]← 1[t]− p(o)vf
1[t]← 1[t]t
1[t]← 1[t]− v∗1[t− 1]
return 1[t]
4 Experiments
We experimented on a game with three battlefields f1, f2, f3, with values v1 = 0.7, v2 = 0.2, v3 = 0.1, and
three outcomes:
• Outcome 1 has f1 in slot 1, f2 in slot 2, f3 in slot 3
• Outcome 2 has f3 in slot 1, f1 in slot 2, f2 in slot 3
• Outcome 3 has f2 in slot 1, f3 in slot 2, f1 in slot 3.
We assume that player 2 observes the outcome while player 1 does not. We used a budget B1 = 10 for
player 1 and B2 = 7 for player 2. We used δ = 0.0001. We used the default feasibility tolerance in Gurobi
which is 1.0× 10−6. We ran our algorithm for 5,000 iterations, and computed  for each player every 10
iterations. The experiments did not use any sampling, and computed the best response against the opponent’s
full mixed strategy at each iteration using the mixed-integer linear programs described in Section 3. We used
the parallel version of Gurobi’s mixed integer linear programming solver [23] with 6 cores on a laptop.
The results are shown in Figure 1. It took slightly under 25,000 seconds (around 6.9 hours) to run 5,000
iterations of our algorithm. The final strategies had an exploitability of 0.0307 for player 1 and 0.0292 for
player 2, indicating that the strategies constitute an -equilibrium for  = 0.0307. (After 5,000 additional
iterations  decreased further to 0.021.) The exploitability values are not monotonically decreasing, and the
lowest value in these experiments was actually obtained with  = 0.0259 at iteration 4480. The expected
value for player 1 in the final strategies is -0.10969. The exploitability fell below 0.05 for the first time after
1759.4 seconds (29.3 minutes), obtaining  = 0.0494 on iteration 1400. From the figure we can also see
that the running times varied for the different iterations, as expected (nearly half of the 5,000 iterations were
completed in the first 5,000 seconds).
5 Conclusion
We presented a new algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium in a broad class of continuous games. The
algorithm is based on integrating a novel variant of fictitious play in which the strategies from all iterations
are stored with custom best response functions. Solving continuous games is particularly challenging as
Nash equilibrium is not even guaranteed to exist and mixed strategies may put weight on infinitely many
pure strategies; yet for many realistic games it is more natural to model strategies as subsets of real num-
bers than as integers. We implemented our algorithm on a continuous imperfect-information model of the
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Figure 1: Exploitability vs. running time (in seconds) and algorithm iteration for continuous Blotto game.
Blotto game, a well-studied model of resource allocation with applications to national security, voting, and
auctions. We created a new mixed-integer linear program formulation for the best response function. We
demonstrated that the algorithm converged quickly to an -equilibrium for  equal to 0.03 after 5,000 itera-
tions of the algorithm (several hours), which corresponds to 30% of the minimum battlefield value. While
the Blotto game has been studied analytically and efficient algorithms have been developed for the discrete
case, this is the first algorithm for solving the continuous case.
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